Intergovernmental
aid is not, of course, the only tool higher-level governments can use to assist poor or troubled lowerlevel governments.
State governments, for example, can achieve equity objectives by altering the fiscal arrangements within which local governments operate. A state could take over from local governments the financing of certain services, such as social services, that place large burdens on a few jurisdictions,* or, to counter fiscal disparities in education financing, a state could encourage the merger of school districts. Hence, intergovernmental aid should be viewed as *Duke Unlverslty, Durham, NC 27708. **Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244 only one tool, and not always the best tool, to achieve fiscal equity.
We place equity objectives into two classes: categorical equity, which relates to public sector spending, either on specific functions or on all functions, and distributional equity, which is aimed at equalizing the real incomes of local residents. In the following discussion, we focus on state aid to local governments.3 For simplicity of presentation, we assume that local governments have access to only one local revenue source, a local property tax, and recognize that the local tax base per capita varies across jurisdictions.
Many of the specifics of what follows are well known to public finance experts. Our contributions are as follows: to incorporate cost considerations into the various aid formulas, to highlight the similarities and differences among formulas in a common framework, to highlight the role of capitalization in the discussion of equalizing real incomes, and to argue that equalizing aid is a valuable policy tool under some circumstances.
As we use the term, a local government's public service costs indicate how much a jurisdiction must spend to provide a given package of public services at a given quality level. These costs reflect both the cost of inputs and the harshness of the environment for provid-rng public services."' Lolcal governments that must pay more to attract employees from the private sector obviously have higher public service costs than other governments, all else equal.' Moreover, as first pointed out by Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1!369), a jurisdiction with a harsh enviroinment must pay more, all else equal, to obtain the same service quality. Extensive old housing, for example, raises the cost of fire protection, and a concentration of poor or disadvantaged residents raises the cost of rnost local public services.
In practice, costs c(an be derived from the coefficients of input and environmental cost factors in a multivariate regression analysis of Ilocal public spending that controls for income, price, and taste variation across jurisdictions.6 To facilitate their inclusion tn an equalizing aid formula, these estimated costs are best expressed in index form, with the index equal to one in (a jurisdiction with average costs. To avoid giving inappropriate incentives to recipient jurisdictions, the cost factors included in this index should be largely, if not totally, outside the control of locall public officials.
CATEGORICAL EQUITY ARGUMENTS FOR EQUALIZING AID
The most fundamental equity argument for equalizing aid is categorical equity, which exists when all citizens have fair access to public services that are thought to be particularly important to their opportunities in life.7 Although policy makers at any higher level of government may have categorical equity objectives, the attainment of categorical equity is particularly important to states, each of which bealrs the primary responsibility for its system of local governrments and the resulting distribution of local public services. This section presents several possible categorical equity objectives for a donor government (that is, several possible definitions oif fair access), and describes the grants needed to achieve them.8
Ensuring a Minimum Outcome
One widely applied categorical equity standard requires that all citizens (or students) have access to a minimum quality of public services. This standard can be applied to an individual public service, such as education or public safety, or to local public: services in general.
The most direct way to achieve this standard is with a foundation grant, which ensures that each jurisdiction can reach some minimum level of spending per capita, labeled IF*, if it is willing to levy a property tax rate, labeled t", that is considered to be a fair minirnum.g Both the mtnimum level of spending and the minimum fair tax rate are policy parameters that must be set by public officrals.
With this approach, the state grant per capita to jurisdiction i, A,, equals the minimum spending minus the local revenue that can be raised at the fair tax rate. If L; is the property tax base per capita in jurisdiction i, then the foundation formula is A, = E* --I+* 4.
An alternative version of this formula highlights the fact that a foundation grant is a block grant, which means that it does not vary with a jurisdiction's chosen spending level, and that it is larger for jurisdictions with relatively small tax bases." If V* is defined as the tax base at which /\, equals zero, it follows immediately that E* = t* V* or t* = E*/V*. This approach easily can be extended to include public service costs. In this case, the first policy parameter is the minimum acceptable service quality, S*; C, is a cost index for jurisdiction i; and state aid is the difference between the spending needed to achieve S*, namely S*C,, and local revenue at the fair tax rate. In practice, S* can be set equal to the minimum acceptable spending in a community with average costs, that is, with C, = 1. In symbols,
A, = 5" C, -t" v,.
Now redefine V* to be the tax base at which state aid would equal zero assuming a cost index equal to unity, so that t* = S*/V* and A, = .S* C, -;
( 1 This formula describes a block grant that depends both on a jurisdiction's costs and tax base. Remember that the cost index, C,, is defined as a jurisdictions's costs relative to the average jurisdiction; hence the terms in brackets are both expressed in relative terms.
A foundation grant makes it possible for a jurisdiction to provide the minimum acceptable service level at the fair minimum tax rate. It does not guarantee, however, that a community actually will provide this level unless it is accompanied by the requirement that the jurisdiction levy at least the minimum tax rate, t", to support the relevant service or services."
Easing the Burden of Providing Standard-Quality Public Services
Sometimes a donor government is unwilling to require local governments to provide a specific service level on the grounds that local governments should be free to make their own decisions. Nevertheless, because some jurisdictions are fiscally disadvantaged relative to others and some service or services are viewed as particularly important, the donor government may want, without imposing a spending requirement, to help equalize the ease with which jurisdictions can achieve a specified service level. Fiscal disadvantages arise from two sources: below-average capacity to raise revenue, as measured by V,, and aboveaverage costs of providing the standard service quality, as measured by C,. Hence, to successfully ease the burden of providing standard-quality public services, the donor government should give more aid to jurisdictions that have larger fiscal disadvantages, measured by what we call the need-capacity gap.'* This approach makes it possible for all jurisdictions to move toward standard-quality services at a standard tax rate.
To be specific, we define a jurisdiction's need-capacity gap as the difference between its expenditure need and its revenue-raising capacity, all defined in per capita terms. Expenditure need is the amount of money required for the jurisdiction to provide the standard-quality services and is calculated as the standardized service quality, S', multiplied by the jurisdiction's cost index, C,.13 Revenue-raising capacity is the amount of money a jurisdiction could raise at a standard tax rate given its own tax base, which equals the standard tax rate, t', multiplied by y.14 The need-capacity gap Indicates the extent to which the revenue the jurisdiction can raise at a standard tax rate falls short of the amount it must spend to provide standard-quality public services. The meaning of "standard" must be set by policy makers; that is, 5' and t' are policy parameters.
Once the need-capacity gap has been defined, the natural grant system is to (close a certain portion of the gap in leach jurisdiction. In symbols,
where a and b are polucy parameters that define the aid program. Defining G' as the gap at which ailcl equals zero, we find that a == -bG'. Substituting this result into equation '5 yields:
As before, negative aicl is not allowed, so jurisdictions with a gap less than G' receive no ald.
Foundation grants are a special case of this formula, in which b is set equal to one (that is, the entire gap IS closed); 5;' is set at the minimlum acceptable level of services '5"; t' IIS set at what is believed to be the minimum fair tax rate, t'*; and G' is set to zero (that is, jurisdictions that can afford the minimum service quality at the fair tax rate receive no aid).
The more general form in equation 6 allows a grant progr(am 1.0 close only part of the gap between expenditure need and revenue-raising capacity and to give some aid to jurisdictions that have negative need-capacity gaps. With b less than one and without a requirement that each jurisdiction imposSe at least the standard tax rate, t', the grant program helps jurisdictions move toward the selected service level at a fair tax rate, but neither fully funds the move to this outcome nor requires it. Moreover, the amount apipropriated for the glrant program determines the extent of equalization. In general, there is an invlerse relationship between b and the program's budget, holding G' constant; raising G', that is, excluding more jurisdictions from aid, increases the value of b that can be achieved for a given budget.15
Ensuring Equal Service for a Given Sacrifice
Another widely discussed categiorical equity objective is to ensure that every jurisdiction willing to make a certain level of sacrifice will receive the same level of public services, regardless of its own tax base. In l.his context:, "'sacrifice" is defined as thle effective property tax rate.16 Grants to achieve this objective are called "power-equaUizing" grants. In 1'991-2, eight states used some form of power-equalizing grant, usually with severe restrictions, to help finance local education (Gold et a/., 1992).
In equation form, this objective is to set where i/ is a policy parameter Since local revenue equals $V, and state aId equals the difference between spending and local revenue, this formula leads directly to
Now solving equation 7 for 5 and substituting the result into equation 8 yields q l Following the same steps as before, this equation leads to the grant formula is higher for jurisdictions with lower tax bases. Note that when the two policy parameters, V* and \i are equal, the term in brackets is the same as for a foundation formula, but this term is multiplied by actual spending in equation 9, not by the state-determined minimum spending as in equation 2. With a power-equalizing formula, in other words, a jurisdiction's aid depends both on the spending level it selects and on the divergence between its tax base and the tax base designated by policy makNow the matching rate, that is, the state's share of total spending, depends on a jurisdictions's cost index as well as its tax base. Equation 11 differs from the cost-adjusted foundation formula, equation 4, because it is based on a jurisdiction's actual real spending (or service quality), not on a fixed minimum real spending. ers.
Wealth Neutrality Note also that the policy parameters in equations 9 and 2 need not be the same. The derivation of equation 9 does not assume that power-equalizing grants go only to a subset of jurisdictions. Thus, if \i is set at any level below the tax base of the richest jurisdiction, the formula implies that some jurisdictions will have negative matching rates, an outcome that usually is politically unacceptable.17 Negative matching rates can
In some of the early school' finance cases, courts ruled that the wealth of the local school district should be viewed as a "suspect category," which constitutionally cannot serve as the basis for differences in the quality of education services, often measured by per pupil spending, available to pupils across the state.lg These rulings express another possible equity objective, called wealth neutrality, which requires that variation across districts in per pupil spending, or preferably in school service levels, be uncorrelated with variation in the per pupil property tax base, a measure of wealth. Wealth neutrality could be an objective for other public services as well.
be eliminated by raising \;/, but this action would increase the cost of the program. Instead, power-equalizing grants, as implemented, virtually always override the formula to assure a minimum amount of aid for each jurisdiction and thereby limit the extent of equalization relative to equation 9.
One way to achieve this outcome is to redefine school districts so that they all have the same tax base per pupil. By eliminating variation in district tax bases, this nonaid approach would assure that any remaining variation in spending or service levels was uncorrelated with district wealth.20 Given the obvious political difficulties of redrawing district boundaries, the challenge is to design an interThis type of grant also can be modified to account for a jurisdiction's costs." In particular, the defining equation can be restated to say that service quality, or real spending, will depend only on sacrifice. In symbols, governmental aid formula that the same goal. In conclusion, no state has attempted to implement a program that would literally be wealth-neutral. Foundation and power-equalization programs move toward this objective, at least if implemented in pure form, but they cannot achieve it. Programs that could achieve wealth neutrality are either too complicated, in the sense that they must be based on estimated elasticities, or too expensive, in the sense that they involve extensive redistribution, to be politically feasible-at least so far.
Ensuring Equal Outcomes
An even stronger equity objective than wealth neutrality is complete equality in service levels. This objective is based on the view that czrtain public services (education, police, or fire, for example) are so important to a person's life chances that all citizens should have equal access to them, regardless of their circumstances or the circumstances of their community.26
None of the plans described so far meets this objective. If they are implemented without limits and loopholes, they all move toward it, but none of them achieves full equality of outcomes. A foundation grant places no limit on the spending by rich districts; powerequalizing grants do not even achieve wealth neutrality, which is a necessary condition for equal outcomes; and wealth-neutral grants do not eliminate spending variation that is uncorrelated with wealth.
The only way we know of to meet this objective through grants is to use a foundation plan that requires each jurisdiction to set its tax rate exactly at t*.27
However, attempts to restrict the school tax rates of wealthy jurisdictions have proved to be unpopular and could, as emphasized by Reschovsky (1994) , encourage wealthy taxpayers to send their children to private schools.28 In principle, these political problems could be avoided if the "minimum acceptable level" were set above the spending that any jurisdiction would select, but this approach would run into another political problem: its prohibitive expense.
The Case for Equalizing Grants
In our judgement, a strong case can be made for equalizing grants to achieve categorical equity, although the appropriate form of the grants depends on the circumstances. According to their constitutions, many state governments are explicitly responsible for the character of the system that provides elementary and secondary education (see Reschovsky, 1994) . We believe that a state's most fundamental responsibility in education is to ensure that every student receives a minimum acceptable level of educational services. Thus, we agree with Reschovsky (1994) that the best grant program for education is a "complete" foundation plan with a required minimum tax rate, with costs in the formula, and, we would add, with a relatively high minimum service quality.
Compared to ensuring a minimum acceptable education, the objectives of equal service per unit sacrifice, of wealth neutrality, or of equal outcomes are stronger in the sense that they require adjustments by all districts, including those that would provide high-quality education without additional assistance. However, controversy surrounding these stronger objectives inevitably leads to compromises that severely limit the extent of equalization.
Some people support programs to promote equal service per unit sacrifice or wealth neutrality because those programs allow some variation In service quality even at low levels of wealth and thereby enhance choice for parents.2g We believe that this extra choice comes at a high equity cost imposed on the students who conse-grant-induced increases in service quality are canceled by rent increases and that the benefits to homeowners are confined to people who currently own property in the community. Homeowners who arrive in the future must pay a higher price to enter the community and therefore are no better off as a result of the improved services. With capitalization, therefore, an equalizing grant program appears likely to help many current low-income homeowners and current landlords (some of whom may have low incomes), but appears unlikely to help low-income renters or future low-income homeowners.
Moreover, the existence of capitalization undercuts to some degree an implicit premise in the basic objective of equalizing real incomes, namely that a person's real income depends in part on the service quality and tax rate in the jurisdiction where she lives.33 If all households are mobile, every household with a given set of skills and preferences can achieve the same real income. Hence, because of compensation in the form of lower housing prices, low-income households who live in jurisdictions with poor public services or high taxes already are no worse off than low-income households who live in jurisdictions with excellent services or low taxes.
For two reasons, however, this capitalization argument neither completely invalidates the premise that real incomes depend on public service quality nor completely eliminates the possibility of using intergovernmental grants to equalize real incomes. The first reason is that age, disability, poverty, and discrimination reduce the mobility of many lowincome people.34 With barriers to mobility, differences in service quality or tax rates need not be fully reflected in housing prices.
The second reason is that even if lowincome people are mobile, the impact of grants on housing prices depends on the solution to a complex general equilibrium problem, which does not always yield offsetting housing price changes. A general treatment of this problem is not available, but this point can be illustrated by examining several special cases.
Suppose, for example, that all low-income people live in central cities with poor public services, that these central cities contain only low-income people, and that all of these central cities receive equalizing grants. Because capitalization reflects competition among households of a given type for housing in communities with different public service levels, there is nothing to capitalize in this case. Hence, the real incomes of all lowincome households are depressed by the fact that they receive low-quality public services, and raising the quality of public services in all these central cities boosts the real incomes of all low-income households without having any impact on prices. In other words, if a grant program raises service quality in every jurisdiction where low-income people live, a capitalization effect does not arise, and capitalization has no impact either on the validity of the objective or on the ability of grants to achieve it. Wyckoff (1992) analyzes an alternative case in which there are two communities and three income classes. One community (call it the central city) contains all low-income households, the other (call it the suburb) contains all highincome households, and both contain some of the middle-income households. In this case, capitalization reflects the service demands of the middle-income households who are the households at the moving margin. Raising service quality in the central city therefore boosts the price of housing enough to keep middle-income households in equilib-rium, that is,. enough to offset middleincome households' valuation of the increment in service quality. This change in housing price could be higher than, lower than, or equal to the value of the public service increment to low-income households. It follows ,that the real inc:ome of low-income households could go down, go up, or be unchanged by equalizing grants. Wyckoff also shows that if the central city contains "a large fraction of the population of the metropolitan area, most of the relative price changes between housing prices in the two commul7ities necessary to restore middle class indifference are accomplished by price changes in the" suburb (p. 22). In this case, intergovernmental aid has the desired effect; that is, it raises the re131 income of low-income households.
We conclude that capitalization weakens, but does not eliminate, the case for using intergovernmental grants to equalize real incomes. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which capitalization offsets the redistributional benefits of these grants.
Conclusions
Both state government:s and the federal government have 21 long history of attempting to meet equity objectives through intergovernmental grants. The key step in designing an equalizing grant program is deciding on the form of this equity objective. Many different categorical equity objectives, including the guarantee of a minimum service quality and wealth neutlrality, can be attained with an appropriately designed equalizing aid program, and under some circumstances equalizing grants c:an make a contribution to a fairer distribution of real incomes. Moreover, because all relevant equity objectives are concerned with service quality, not spending as such, grant formulas to achieve them must account for public service costs. Although few grant programs account for costs in a systematic way, methods for doing so are readily available Different equity objectives and grant programs are appropriate under different circumstances. In our judgement, a complete foundation plan, that is, 'a foundation plan that requires a minimum tax rate, accounts for costs, and sets a relatively high minimum service level, is appropriate for elementary and secondary education. For police, fire, and other local services, grants based on the needcapacity gap provide a flexible way to focus aid on the jurisdictions that, through no fault of their own, need help the most.
ENDNOTES
For a discussion of some of the eificiency arguments in favor of equalizing aid, see Ladd and Yinger (1991) and Oates and Schwab (1988) . For some efficiency arguments against equalizing aid, see Oakland (1994) .
Around 1970, for example, many states moved the responsibility for welfare services from the city to the county or state level. See Ladd and Ylnger (19'91) . For an analysis of the extent of equalization in existing state aid lo local governments, see Yinger and Ladd (1989) . The fact that household characteristics may influence the environment for providing public services leads to an important efficiency argument for equalizing grants, namely, to offset the externality imposed on jurisdlc:tions when low-cost individuals leave. See O&es and Schwab (1988) . Note that actual public wages are a poor measure of costs because they are influenced by local officials. Cost Imeasures---and hence aid formulas-should be based on factors outside the control of local officials. For more on this issue, see Ladd and Yingeir (1991) .
For examples of this procedure, see Bradbury et al. (1984) , Ratcliffe, Riddle, ancl Yinger (1990) , Ladd and Yinger (1991), and Ladd, Reschovsky, and Ylnger (1991) . Oakland (1994) states that because "spending is not a valid measure of output the coefficients 220 produced by spending studies measure handicap only if actual budget policy compensates exactly for the handicap."
This argument is not correct. The regression-based method is rigorous and requires no such assumption. See Yinger and Ladd (1991, chapter 10) .
' Oakland (1994) discounts categorical equity objectives (except, apparently, in the case of education) because he sees no reason to think that public services are worth more to people than are private goods and services. We find categorical equity worthwhile not only because certain public services, such as education and public safety, are important to a person's opportunities, but also because a person cannot directly select the level of public services he or she receives.
a If many citizens believe in any of these equity objectives (or the one in the next section), then there is an efficiency gain to equalizing grants that parallels each equity objective. This is an application of the well-known theory of efficiency-improving redistribution (Hochman and Rogers, 1969) . See also Ladd and Doolittle (1982) . ' The issue of property tax capitalization, which is discussed at length in a later section, is not relevant here. The minimum service objective (along with most of the other categorical equity objectives)
includes a statement about the share of a jurisdiction's tax base that represents a fair contribution to the provrsion of the relevant public services. The fact that a JUrisdiction's property tax base may reflect the tax rate that it actually selects has nothing to do with selection of this share. One might object, however, to the use of the property tax base as a measure of a jurisdiction's capacity to raise revenue, because it reflects the jurisdiction's actual tax decisions. This problem can be solved by using a more general measure of revenue-raising capacity, which is discussed in endnote 14.
lo Grants inversely related to a jurisdiction's tax base also may have efficiency consequences. Oakland (1994) argues that they may either offset distortions that arise when location decisions are based on tax or service levels or lower efficiency by lowering interjurisdictional variation in service-tax packages. Others have argued that these grants undercut a jurisdiction's Incentive to attract more property.
Because broad economic and social forces have a much larger influence on a city's tax base than anything the city can do, we do not find this argument compelling. See Ladd and Yinger (1991) . " An equivalent requirement is that the jurisdiction spend at least S*C, on the service. Note 15 that if t* is defined as the minimum tax rate required for a jurisdiction to be eligible for the program, Instead of the minimum tax rate permitted, then some low-spending jurisdictions might choose not to participate in the grant program at all.
Grants of this type were implemented by the state of Massachusetts in 1980 . See Bradbury et al. (1984 . Grants of this type also are described in Ratcliffe, Riddle and Yinger (1990) and Ladd, Reschovsky, and Yinger (1991) .
In some cases, a measure of expenditure need also must account for differences across jurisdictions in service responsibilities.
See Ladd and Yinger (1991) .
An alternative approach to revenue-raising capacity is given by Ladd and Yinger (1991) . In this approach, a jurisdiction's capacity is the amount it could raise at a standard tax burden on its residents. Ladd and Yinger show how this measure of capacity depends on a jurisdiction's income and its ability to export tax burdens to nonresidents.
This approach is more complicated to implement, however, largely because export ratios are difficult to esttmate, and It appears to be highly correlated with the tax-base approach used in the text. In Minnesota, for example, the correlation between the two approaches across municipalities is 0.92. See Ladd, Reschovsky, and Yinger (1991).
These claims can easily be proven by substituting the formula for aid per capita, equation 6, into the program's budget constraint and rearranging the terms. This budget constraint can be written as follows:
where B is the total budget for the program, J is the number of jurisdictions that receive aid, and IV, is the population of jurisdiction i. Yinger (1990) . 24 The precise forms o.f the block grant and matching grant can be found from the median voter's budget constraint. In a standard model, the Iblock grant equals the difference between the target income (a policy parameter) and the median voter's actual income dlvided by the median voter's tax share (which IS her house value divided by house value pclr capita In the jurisdiction).
Assuming constant costs in the production of service quality, the matching rate equals the jurisdiction's cost index divided by the imedian voter's tax share and by the target tax price (another policy parameter). For a deri'rfatiol-1 of this type of grant in a more complex model, see Yinger (1986) . Strictly speaking, this approach raises two new issues. First, it Iremoves all systematic correlation between wealth and service outcomes, but not literally all correlation, as does the Feldstein approach.
IPreference differences that are correlated with wealth, for example, still might influence outcomes.
Second, it as sumes that it is appropriate to base grants on a majority rule (or median-voter) framework even if actual decisions diverge from what the median voter would choose. Moreover, it assumes that the median voter can be identified as the person with median income and median preferences.
The conditions under which this is true are stated by Bergstrom and Goodm,jn (1973) .
In addition, this apprloach achieves only the weaker form of wealth neutrality described in the previous endnote, vvhich may Nor may not satisfy courts in school equity cases. Reschovsky (1994) points out that several state courts appear to be requiring this objective for education.
One way to achieve Ithis objective without a grant is for a state to take over provtsion of the service, and then to provide the same service level rn each community.
In Hawaii, for example, education is provided at the state level and, in principle, the same level of education could be (but undoubtedly IS not) provided in each school. Another way is for the state to "take over" the local property tax. See Giertz and McGuire (1992) . In Kansas, for example, every distric:t must levy the same state-determined property tax rate and return any revenue above a certain amount to the state. Districts also can supplement their revenue with an additional local levy, although this option IS scheduled to phase out. See Myers ( 19!32).
A description of a debate over restric:tions on the tax levy for high-wealth districts can be found In a case entitled "Funding Schools in Washington State" in Gomez-lbanez and Kalt (1990) Oakland ('I 994) cnticlzes equalizing aid programs for dlmlnlshlng efficiency-enhancing variation In public service outcomes.
However, efflclency (does not require variation in outcomes associated with income or wealth; instead, It requires that communities with different preferences at any given level of Income or wealth be allowed to make different choices For more detailed discussions of this issue, see Yinger (1986 ) or Wyckoff (1992 .
For a review of existing studies with a focus on tax capitalization, see Yinger ei' al. (1988) .
Although the impact of public service quality on rent:, is, not I,terally an example of "capitalization," because It does not involve an asset pricc2, it generally is Included in the concept of capitalization.
In addition, note that when many urban areas are considered, service quality or tax differences also could be
